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Abstract  
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can independently affect the capital ratio, once the influences of the level of central bank 
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TRADE OPENNESS, CAPITAL MOBILITY, AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO 
 
1.  Introduction 
The path-breaking work of Romer (1993) highlighted an apparent inverse 
relationship in cross-country data between the degree of openness to international trade 
and the inflation rate.  Romer‘s suggested explanation for this relationship is that 
increased trade openness exposes a nation to greater negative terms-of-trade effects 
resulting from domestic output expansions, thereby reducing the incentive for a central 
bank to engage in inflationary policymaking.  Lane (1997) supplemented this rationale 
by proposing that increased trade openness reduces the potential output gains from 
unexpected inflation in non-traded-goods sectors characterized by imperfect 
competition and sticky product prices.  In addition, Karras (1999) argued that greater 
indexation of nominal wages to unexpected inflation in response to increased trade 
openness could also reduce the incentive for central banks to inflate.   
Temple (2002), however, questioned the relevance of explanations relying on a 
presumption that increased trade openness reduces the sacrifice ratio, because 
analysis of cross-country data failed to reveal such a relationship.  Indeed, Daniels, 
Nourzad, and VanHoose (2005) have recently offered evidence indicating that once the 
role of central bank independence is considered, increased trade openness is 
associated with an increase in the sacrifice ratio, a result consistent with the analysis of 
Rogoff (2006), enunciations of some policymakers, such as Bean (2006), and evidence 
provided by Duca and VanHoose (2000) indicating that increases in product-market 
competition from both domestic and international sources have contributed to a 
shallower U.S. Phillips curve.  This finding is obviously at odds with a standard Barro-
Gordon (1983) interpretation, although Daniels and VanHoose (2006) have provided a 
theoretical rationale for how increased trade openness could both raise the sacrifice 
ratio and reduce equilibrium inflation when imperfectly competitive product markets are 
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included in an open-economy Barro-Gordon analysis.  Furthermore, Bowdler (2004) 
suggests that the nature of the trade openness-sacrifice ratio relationship may depend 
on the exchange-rate regime that is in place.   
Separately, an additional line of research has focused on the other key aspect of 
globalization, capital mobility, and its relationship with both the sacrifice ratio and 
inflation.  Gruben and McLeod (2002, 2004) suggest that increased capital mobility may 
act as a policy commitment mechanism that yields lower equilibrium inflation and 
present evidence supporting a disinflationary role for higher capital mobility.  At the 
same time, however, work by Razin and Yuen (2002), Loungani, Razin, and Yuen 
(2001), and Razin and Loungani (2005) has suggested a positive relationship between 
capital mobility and the sacrifice ratio—again, a result inconsistent with a narrow Barro-
Gordon-style interpretation.  As a rationalization of how greater capital mobility could 
simultaneously contribute to lower inflation while increasing the sacrifice ratio, Razin 
and Loungani suggest that globalization may have boosted policymakers‘ loss weight 
on inflation and thereby induced lower equilibrium inflation. 
Clearly, there remains a wide array of views regarding the effects of globalization 
on the sacrifice ratio and the relationship between these effects and the trade 
openness-inflation and capital mobility-inflation relationship.  Some have, for instance, 
questioned whether the trade openness-inflation relationship either may be illusory, as 
suggested by Terra (1998), or may have shifted or even broken down since the early 
1990s, as argued by Bleaney (1999).  Indeed, Ball (2006) questions whether there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude, at least for the United States, that either trade openness 
or capital mobility is related to either the sacrifice ratio or inflation. 
In light of these conflicting views, further exploration of the effects of greater 
trade openness and capital mobility is clearly warranted.  In this paper, our objective is 
to investigate the separate and combined effects of both potential manifestations of 
globalization—increased trade openness and greater capital mobility—on the sacrifice 
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ratio.  We develop a simple open-economy model that incorporates both openness to 
trade and the mobility of capital, and we analyze its predictions regarding effects of both 
forms of globalization on the sacrifice ratio.  As emphasized with respect to trade 
openness by Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and with regard to capital mobility by 
Loungani, Razin, and Yuen (2001), the extent to which nominal rigidities are a prevalent 
feature of a nation‘s economy has a critical bearing on how globalization affects the 
sacrifice ratio.  Thus, we utilize a model in which a portion of firms utilizes nominal wage 
contracts and in which remaining firms do not.   
Our consideration of wage contracts as a source of nominal rigidity differs from 
the recent emphasis on price stickiness in much of the recent literature.  In part, this 
choice is based on evidence that nominal wage rigidities are an important factor in the 
openness-inflation relationship (see Daniels, Nourzad, and VanHoose, 2006).  More 
generally, however, this choice reflects our fundamental agreement with Cukierman 
(2004), who argues out that adding product-price stickiness to input-price stickiness 
arising from nominal wage contracts ultimately adds little of fundamental importance to 
the nature of analysis of trade-offs faced by policymakers.1  Indeed, consistent with 
Cukierman‘s point, our model yields sacrifice-ratio implications for firms utilizing nominal 
wage contracts that are analogous to those obtained by Razin and Yuen (2002), 
Loungani, Razin and Yuen (2001), and Razin and Loungani (2005) in their sticky-price-
based analyses of the openness-sacrifice ratio relationship.  Nevertheless, our inclusion 
of firms that face no direct nominal wage rigidities—but which nonetheless confront 
spillovers created by nominal wage rigidities at other firms in the economy, as in Duca 
(1987) and Duca and VanHoose (2001)—allows for partial price adjustment that 
generalizes our analysis of the effects of greater capital mobility and its interaction with 
impacts of increased trade openness. 
The next section presents our theoretical framework, and section 3 investigates 
its implications for the relationships among trade openness, capital mobility, and the 
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sacrifice ratio.  Section 4 explores the empirical evidence regarding these relationships.  
Section 5 summarizes our conclusions. 
 
2.  A Simple Open-Economy Model 
 The theoretical model combines elements of the framework utilized by Benavie 
(1983) and Daniels (1997) and the model developed in Daniels and VanHoose (2006).  
There are numerous atomistic firms, indexed i, distributed uniformly along a unit 
interval.  In a portion, , of firms, nominal wages are set in advance of labor-market 
clearing.  In the portion of firms, 1-, that do not utilize such contracts, spot labor 
markets determine nominal wages.  In a closed-economy version of this type of model, 
Duca and VanHoose (2001) have shown that if risk-neutral firms and risk-averse 
workers face common aggregate shocks and diverse firm-specific disturbances, the 
contract share of firms   typically lies between zero and unity but rises as the volatility 
of aggregate shocks increases relative to the variability of firm-specific disturbances.  To 
focus on the issues at hand, we treat   as an exogenous parameter and thereby 
abstract from considerations of shocks that can affect the share of firms with nominal 
wage contracts.   
The output produced by a given firm i is given by 
 
(1) yi = li , 
 
where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at firm i.  The demand for the 
output of a domestic firm in sector i as a share of aggregate domestic output is 
 
 
(2) yi - y = -(pi - p),                 
 
where y 
1
0 diy i  is the log of aggregate domestic output, p 
1
0 dip i  is the log of the 
aggregate domestic price level, and  > 1 is the elasticity of demand for the output of 
firms in sector i of the domestic country. 
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The domestic nation‘s income-expenditure equilibrium condition (for a derivation 
of this Cobb-Douglas approximation, see, for instance, Canzoneri and Henderson, 
1991, or Bryson, et al., 1993) is given by 
 
 
(3) y =  (p* + s - p) + (1-  )y +  y* -  [r – ( e+p 1- p)];  
 
where the average propensity to import,  , is a fraction;  is the elasticity of desired 
spending with respect to the real exchange rate; p* is the log of the aggregate foreign 
price level; s is the log of the domestic currency price of foreign currency; y* is the log of 
aggregate foreign output;  is the semi-elasticity of domestic spending with respect to 
the domestic real interest rate; r is the domestic nominal interest rate, and e+p 1  is the 
current expected value of the log of the price level in the next period.    
Domestic money market equilibrium is given by   
 
(4) m – p = σy - γr – ξ(r* + e+s 1  - s), 
 
where m is the log of the money stock, r* is the foreign nominal interest rate, s is the log 
of the nominal exchange rate measured in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency, and e+s 1  is the current expected value of the log of the exchange rate in the 
following period.  Including (4) would permit a thorough-going analysis of the 
implications of this model for equilibrium inflation in a setting in which the nominal 
money stock is an instrument of monetary policy.  In a setting in which the instrument of 
monetary policy is the interest rate, (4) would play a role in determining the resulting 
endogenous quantity of money.   
 The balance-of-payments equilibrium condition is2 
 
(5) (1+ )(p* + s - p) -  y +  r -  (r* + e+s 1  - s) +  y
* = 0, 
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where  ,  ,  , ψ, and φ are nonnegative structural parameters.  Note that if   = ψ 
and  = , then domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes.  If additionally the 
limiting case holds in which  , then there is also complete capital mobility, and the 
uncovered interest parity condition is satisfied; that is, r = r* + e+s 1  - s.  More generally, a 
higher value of  indicates an increase in the degree of capital mobility irrespective of 
the substitutability of domestic and foreign bonds, as long as  > 0 and ψ > 0. 
Specifying analogous structural relationships for a foreign nation would yield a 
two-country framework in which y*, p*, and r* would be endogenous variables, but here 
we assume the output and prices abroad are exogenously determined.  Henceforth, the 
foreign money stock, foreign price level, and foreign output are normalized at unity, so 
that p* and y* equal zero, and r* is assumed equal to ρ, a constant world interest rate. 
 Using (5), (3), (2), and (1) in the profit function, PiYi – WiLi , yields the labor 
demand function for a firm i (with the intercept suppressed because it plays no role in 
our subsequent analysis): 
 
       
   

d
i
e e
i   w - p p+ + + p s r
l
 +  - 
+1 +1
 
- ( ) - (1 ) ( + ) -
(6)      =  ,
( )
 
 
where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm,    1+ (1- )+ , 
     (1+ + )+ , and      (1+ + )+ .  Workers can consume domestic 
and foreign goods, so labor supply to firms depends on the real wage computed in 
terms of the overall price workers pay for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods: 
 
(7) li
s = [wi – (1-β)p – βs], 
 
where  > 0.  Thus, for firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-information, 
market-clearing wage satisfies (6) and (7) simultaneously and equals 
 
[ ]
                 
     
   
 
e e
^
 i
p p s s r
w = 
2
+1 +1
[ (1- )  ( ) + ( - )] + (1+ + ) +  ( ) + ( + ) -
 ( ) + 
(8)        .
Λ
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Substitution of (8) into either (6) or (7) and the result into (1) yields output of a 
noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages:   
 
[ ]
               
     
 
 
e e
mc
i
p p s s r
y
2
+1 +1
 
{[1- (1- )] - } + (1+ + ) +  ( ) + ( + ) -
=  .
 ( ) + 
(9)     
Λ
 
Thus, the output of firms with market-determined nominal wages naturally depends on 
the current price level, anticipated exchange rate, and interest rate and on the 
anticipated future price level and exchange rate. 
For the fraction, , of firms with nominal wage contracts, if the contract wage is 
equal to the expected value of the market clearing wage, substituting the expectation of 
(8) into (6) and the result in (1) yields output of a firm with wage contracts, given by 
 
2
2
[ { [
[ ]
{ [ ] } [ ]
[ ]
   
               
   
          
      
 

e
c
i
e e e
p p p
y
s s r r
+1
 
2
+1
e
( - )[ + ] - (1- ) + ( - )] + + - (1+ + )]}
= 
 + 
 + - ( + ) - -  + -
(10)  ,
( - ) + 
 +
Λ Λ
 
where     ( - ) and where e ep  sand are the expectations of the current price 
level and exchange rate held by wage setters at the beginning of the current period 
based on prior information.  Of course, these latter expectations play key roles in 
determining the contract nominal wage rate established at the outset of the period and 
hence influence equilibrium employment and output levels of firms utilizing wage 
contracts. 
 
3.  Relating Trade Openness and Capital Mobility to the Sacrifice Ratio 
 To explore the separate direct and interactive effects of trade openness and 
capital mobility on the sacrifice ratio, we note first that since firms behave identically, 
c c
iy  = y  for all i  [0, ], and 
mc mc
iy  = y  for all i   (, 1].  It follows that y = (1-)y
mc+ 
yc, so that responsiveness of aggregate output to a change in the domestic price level is 
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given by


y
p
=   
 
 
 
mc cy y
p p
1 .  Hence, the aggregate sacrifice ratio is the weighted 
average of the sacrifice ratio applicable the sacrifice ratio applicable to the portion of 
firms with spot-market-determined wages and the portion utilizing nominal wage 
contracts.    
From (9) and (10), the separate effects of an increase in the price level on output 
for firms with and without nominal wage contracts are given by 
 
{[ }
[ ]
    
     


   ,
1- (1- )]
(11)  = 
( + )+
mcy
p
-
-
 
 
which is more likely to be positive if   is significantly greater than unity, so that product 
markets are highly competitive, and if  is relatively small, so that labor supply is 
relatively inelastic, and 
 
 
   


   (12)  = 
( + )
cy
p
-
-
, 
 
which is also more likely to be positive if   is significantly greater than unity, so that 
there is a relatively significant degree of competition in product markets.   
 
It is straightforward to show that 0




 
 
 

mc
y
p
and that 0




 
 
 

c
y
p
.  As in Daniels and 
VanHoose (2006), greater trade openness causes desired spending on domestic 
products to be responsive to changes in domestic income, which in turn causes profit-
maximizing prices of firms in both labor-market-clearing and wage-contracting sectors to 
be less sensitive to a variation in aggregate domestic output.  As a consequence, the 
aggregate price level is less responsive to a change in aggregate output, implying 
conversely that there is an increased sensitivity of output to a change in the price level.  
Together, these results imply that an increase in the average propensity to import 
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makes desired expenditures on domestic output less sensitive to changes in domestic 
income, so that each firm‘s profit-maximizing price is less responsive to a change in 
aggregate domestic output.  Thus, greater trade openness unambiguously boosts the 
aggregate sacrifice ratio.   
  The effects of increased capital mobility in this model are less clear-cut.  For 
firms at which contracts set nominal wages in advance of product-market clearing, 
cumbersome computations verify that, for  > 0, the sign of 




 
 
 
c
y
p
 hinges in large part 
on the interest-rate sensitivity of aggregate demand relative to the real-exchange-rate 
responsiveness of domestic demand.  This conclusion is analogous to that derived by 
Loungani, Razin, and Yuen (2001) in the context of a combined flexible-price/sticky-
price framework.  As in their model, in the portion of the economy that is not directly 
constrained by nominal rigidities, there is greater scope for interest-rate and real-
exchange-rate adjustments that in turn feed back to induce price and wage adjustments 
at these firms.  In contrast to the economy-wide sticky-price settings considered by 
Razin and Yuen (2002) and Razin and Loungani (2005), which give rise to an 
unambiguously positive value for 




 
 
 
c
y
p
, wage and price adjustments at firms with 
market-determined wages spill over to influence prices at firms utilizing nominal wage 
contracts.  As a consequence, the relative sensitivities of aggregate demand to interest-
rate and real-exchange-rate variations are crucial determinants of the responsiveness of 
output to the price level at firms with market-clearing wages.  It can be shown that, in 
accord with the conclusions of Loungani et al., greater capital mobility boosts the 
sacrifice ratio—that is, 




 
 
 
mc
y
p
> 0—for parameter configurations  and that are 
sufficiently large, so that there is a relatively high interest sensitivity of domestic and 
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foreign asset demands and a relatively large interest responsiveness of desired 
domestic expenditures, and in which   is sufficiently small, so that desired domestic 
spending is relatively unresponsive to variations in the real exchange rate.   
For the portion of the economy comprised of firms with market-determined 
wages, the sign of 




 
 
 
mc
y
p
is highly ambiguous.  At firms with market-clearing wages, 
adjustments of product prices and nominal wages are restrained only to the extent that 
spillovers are created by the failure of wages to adjust at firms with nominal wage 
contracts.  Although interactions among the relative magnitudes of , , , and   
determine the sign of 




 
 
 
mc
y
p
in this case as well, the interplay between fully adjusting 
prices and wages—again, subject to spillovers from firms with nominal wage 
contracts—yields complicated effects of prices on output that are difficult to disentangle.   
The upshot of this analysis is that to the extent that our model yields a prediction 
about how greater capital mobility is likely to influence the sacrifice ratio, this prediction 
depends crucially on the labor supply elasticity, the interest-rate sensitivities of domestic 
and foreign asset demands, and the interest-rate responsiveness of desired domestic 
expenditures.  Under certain parameter configurations we can obtain a definite 
prediction that increased capital mobility is likely to generate a rise in the sacrifice ratio 
in nations in which nominal rigidities are an important feature.  In nations experiencing 
nominal rigidities but contrary parameter configurations, however, the opposite effect 
could emerge.  In countries in which significant portions of firms charge market-
determined product prices and pay market-determined wages, the model yields no 
definite theoretical predictions regarding the effects of greater capital mobility on the 
sacrifice ratio. 
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The model does, however, yield more straightforward implications regarding the 
effects that an increased degree of capital mobility has on the impact of trade openness 
on the sacrifice ratio—that is, the sign of
2
 


 
 
  
 
mc
y
p
.  For both firms with and without 
nominal wage contracts, greater capital mobility enhances the positive effect of trade 
openness on the sacrifice ratio if   and are sufficiently large and   is sufficiently 
small.  Thus, a reinforcing effect of capital mobility on the sacrifice-ratio impact of trade 
openness is also more likely if there is a relatively high interest sensitivity of domestic 
and foreign asset demands and a relatively large interest responsiveness of desired 
domestic spending. 
 Greater trade openness does nothing to clear up the theoretical ambiguities of 
the effects of greater capital mobility on the sacrifice ratio.  Consequently, the 
theoretical model offers no clear-cut predictions regarding whether or not increased 
trade openness may or may not reinforce the impact of greater capital mobility on the 
sacrifice ratio. 
 
4.  Empirical Implications and Evidence 
 The forgoing discussion yields three empirical implications:  
i) taking into account the effect of central bank independence, increased trade 
openness makes output more price-sensitive and consequently raises the 
sacrifice ratio; 
ii) higher capital mobility generally has uncertain affects on the sacrifice ratio, 
but in nations in which the use of nominal wage contracts is more 
widespread, greater capital mobility is more likely to boost the sacrifice ratio if 
domestic spending is relatively responsive to interest-rate changes but 
relatively unresponsive to real-exchange-rate variations; and 
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iii) if domestic expenditures are relatively sensitive to interest-rate variations but 
relatively insensitive to changes in real exchange rates, higher capital mobility 
is likely to reinforce the positive effect of increased trade openness on the 
sacrifice ratio. 
Below, we do not attempt to measure relative responsiveness of aggregate spending to 
interest-rate and exchange-rate variations across countries.  We do, however, utilize 
measures of trade openness, capital mobility, central bank independence, and wage 
duration in an attempt to evaluate the independent and interactive effects of these 
variables on the sacrifice ratio in cross-country data. 
 
   4.1  Data 
We employ the data made available by Temple (2002) and Daniels et al. (2005), 
taken from Ball (1994), to test our hypotheses regarding the sacrifice ratio.  This data 
set includes estimates of the sacrifice ratio (SAC) for 58 disinflationary periods occurring 
in 16 moderate inflation OECD economies from 1960 through the 1980s, initial inflation 
preceding the disinflationary episode, the change in inflation during the disinflationary 
period (InflationΔ), the length of the deflationary period (Length), and a measure of 
wage contract duration (Wdur).  We augment this data with several other variables. 
First, we add the degree of central bank independence (CBI), taken from Franzese 
(2002), which is a weighted average of legal independence, a characterization of 
independence based on answers to a survey completed by individuals at central banks 
(Cukierman, 1992), economic independence, political independence (Grilli, et al., 1991), 
and Bade and Parkin‘s (1982) index of central bank independence. Next we add a 
measure of trade openness (Trade) which is the average of the sum of imports and 
exports as a percentage of GDP over the sample period, and a measure of capital 
mobility (Capital) which is the average of the sum of total capital inflows and outflows as 
a percentage of GDP.  Data on trade flows and capital flows are taken from the 
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International Monetary Fund‘s International Financial Statistics.  Table 1 contains 
descriptive statistics on the sample data. 
 
   4.2  Trade Openness and the Sacrifice Ratio 
Daniels et al. (2005) examine the impact of trade openness on the sacrifice ratio 
using the average of imports as a percentage of GDP.  They show the importance of 
accounting for the interaction of CBI and openness and suggest testing for outliers in 
the data.  We employ the same measures for the sacrifice ratio, but we measure trade 
openness as the average of the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. 
Following Daniels et al., we test for outliers using the DFITS test, Cook‘s distance test, 
and Welsch‘s distance test, and our results similarly identify Germany‘s 1973-1978 
disinflation episode as an outlier.  We drop this single observation from all of our 
regression models.   
The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 reaffirm Daniels et al.‘s conclusion that 
the coefficient of trade openness is insignificant (column 1) unless its interaction with 
central bank independence is included.  Column 2 includes this interaction, with the 
results that the coefficient on trade openness is positive and statistically significant, 
while the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant.  Hence, we re-
attain the Daniels et al. result that trade openness and the sacrifice ratio are positively 
related and greater CBI reduces the effect of trade openness on the sacrifice ratio. 
 
   4.2  Trade Openness, Capital Mobility,, and the Sacrifice Ratio 
Aizenman and Noy (2004) examine the correlation among financial and trade 
openness, measured as the sum of capital inflows and outflows as a percentage of 
GDP and as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, respectively.  
They show that there is a linear two-way feedback relationship among the two 
openness variables.  This simultaneous correlation between the two openness variables 
  
 
14 
is, of course, problematic in our empirical study making it difficult if not impossible to 
isolate the individual effects of trade openness and capital mobility.3  This problem is 
compounded by the fact that some of our variables, CBI and wage duration in particular, 
have limited variability within our data set. One method of dealing with this problem 
would be to expand the sample, not only increasing our degrees of freedom but also the 
variation of key variables. However, combining estimates of the sacrifice ratio, central 
bank independence and (especially) wage duration is problematic and limits our ability 
to expand the data, resulting in less than 60 usable observations. Hence, to examine 
the relationship between capital mobility and the sacrifice ratio, we reduce colinearity 
among the variables by dropping the interaction term between trade openness and 
central bank independence in the remaining columns of Table 2 and in Columns 3, 4, 
and 5 of Table 2 we replace trade openness with capital mobility as the single measure 
of international openness.  Furthermore, we examine the interaction of capital mobility 
with CBI and wage duration separately.4  In column 3, the effect of capital mobility on 
the sacrifice ratio is positive but statistically insignificant.  In column 4, we find that 
accounting for an interaction between capital mobility and central bank independence 
leads to the implication of a positive (statistically significant at the 10 percent level) 
effect of greater capital mobility on the sacrifice ratio.  As with the trade openness 
measure of international openness, however, the impact of capital mobility on the 
sacrifice ratio is significantly reduced by increased central bank independence.   
In comparing columns 3 and 4 to columns 1 and 2, it is tempting to conclude that 
in light of the relatively high bilateral correlation between trade openness and capital 
mobility, the empirical results suggest that both international openness measures are 
essentially substitutable.  Recall, however, that the theoretical model suggests a 
positive interaction between the degree of wage stickiness and the sacrifice-ratio effect 
of greater capital mobility.  Column 5 includes an interaction between our measures of 
these two variables.  Doing so results in a statistically insignificant estimated effect of 
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capital mobility on the sacrifice ratio but a positive (statistically significant at the 10 
percent level) interactive effect of wage duration and capital mobility.  Thus, consistent 
with the theory, the degree of wage stickiness plays a key role in conditioning capital 
mobility‘s sacrifice-ratio impact. 
The relatively high correlation between our trade openness and capital mobility 
measures suggests that including both as independent variables is a problematic 
exercise.  Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness in examining the implications 
forthcoming from the data, in columns 6, 7, and 8 of Table 2 we include both 
international openness measures.  The coefficient estimate for capital mobility is 
positive but statistically insignificant in column 6.  When the interaction between capital 
mobility and wage duration is added in column 7, the direct effect of capital mobility on 
the sacrifice ratio remains statistically insignificant (p-value of 20 percent, two-tailed 
test).  Consistent with theory, however, the effect of an interaction between capital 
mobility and wage duration is positive and significant, indicating that a greater degree of 
wage rigidity tends to bring about a positive effect of increased capital mobility on the 
sacrifice ratio.  Nevertheless, in both of the models for which results are displayed in 
columns 6 and 7, tests of a joint significance of trade and capital mobility effects on the 
sacrifice ratio are insignificant. 
  Column 8 reports the results of adding an interaction term between trade 
openness and capital mobility.  Neither the openness measures nor the interaction term 
are significant, nor are they jointly significant.  Thus, the empirical results do not resolve 
the theoretical prediction indicating that greater capital mobility potentially could 
reinforce the sacrifice-ratio impact of increased trade openness. 
 What can we conclude from these results?  First, consistent with earlier work by 
Daniels et al. (2005) and with the model developed in this paper, increased openness to 
international trade has a positive effect on the sacrifice ratio once the dampening effect 
of greater central bank independence (CBI) is taken into account.  Second, consistent 
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with evidence offered by Razin and Loungani (2005), accounting for the conditioning 
effects of CBI implies that greater capital mobility also boosts the sacrifice ratio.  Third, 
the finding that greater wage stickiness boosts the positive effect of greater capital 
mobility on the sacrifice ratio is consistent with the prediction of our theoretical model 
when aggregate spending is more sensitive to interest-rate variations than to exchange-
rate variations. This finding highlights the importance of considering potential effects 
specific to increased capital mobility rather that considering the impact of ―globalization‖ 
to be captured by trade openness alone. Fourth, the theoretical model suggests that 
increased openness to trade and greater capital mobility may have self-reinforcing 
positive effects on the sacrifice ratio, although the positive correlation between the two 
globalization measures complicates interpreting regression results in which both 
measures are taken to be independent variables.  When we treat both measures of 
international openness as independent variables, we obtain a positive coefficient 
estimate on the interactive effect that the two have on the sacrifice ratio, but this 
estimate is statistically insignificant.   
Taken together, the first three conclusions provide support for concluding from 
cross-country data that increased trade openness and greater capital mobility do indeed 
independently tend to boost the sacrifice ratio.  Thus, our analysis supports the 
conclusion that globalization, whether through more openness to trade or greater 
openness to capital flows, contributes to a shallower Phillips curve.  Although our 
theoretical framework indicates that there is also a potential for interactive effects of the 
two globalization measures on the sacrifice ratio, we do not find evidence of statistically 
significant interacting impacts of increased trade openness and greater capital mobility. 
 
 
  
 
17 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper has developed and empirically evaluated implications of an open-
economy framework exploring the separate impacts of, and interactions among trade 
openness and capital mobility as factors affecting the sacrifice ratio.   Consistent with 
our theoretical model, we find evidence in cross-country data of separate effects of 
increased trade openness and greater capital mobility influence the sacrifice ratio.  
Once the conditioning effect of central bank independence is taken into account, we find 
that increases in both measures of international openness result in a higher sacrifice 
ratio.  We also find evidence that greater wage duration enhances the positive sacrifice-
ratio effect of more mobile capital, which is consistent with our theory‘s implication that 
the impact of greater capital mobility is positively related to the degree of wage 
stickiness in a nation‘s economy.  Although our model suggests the potential for greater 
capital mobility to enhance the sacrifice-ratio impact of increased trade openness, the 
empirical results do not necessarily provide support for this prediction. 
Overall, our analysis of cross-country data supports the conclusion that the 
forces of globalization—whether manifested as from increased openness to 
international trade or greater mobility of capital—tend to raise the sacrifice ratio.  In our 
view, future work examining the impact of globalization on the sacrifice ratio should 
focus on country-specific data [see, for instance, early work along these lines in Ball 
(2006) and Sbordone (2007)].  It remains to be seen to what extent increased trade 
openness and greater capital mobility affect the inflation sensitivity of output and the 
slope of the Phillips curve within individual nations. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Cross-Section of 16 Countries* 
 
 SAC CBI Inflation InflationΔ Length Wdur Trade Capital 
Mean 0.716 0.496 8.134 4.604 2.719 1.404 0.899 0.084 
Median 0.578 0.449 7.800 3.740 2.000 2.000 0.862 0.063 
St. Dev. 0.928 0.194 3.983 2.820 1.386 0.776 0.414 0.053 
 
* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States 
 
Glossary 
SAC ≡ Sacrifice Ratio1 
CBI ≡ Central Bank Independence, index of central bank independence2  
Inflation ≡ Change in GDP deflator1 
InflationΔ ≡ Drop in the rate of inflation during the given period1 
Length ≡ Length of disinflationary period in years1 
Wdur ≡ wage contract duration1 
Trade ≡ ratio of the sum of imports and exports to nominal GDP3 
Capital ≡ sum of capital inflows and capital outflows to nominal GDP3 
1 Temple (2002), Daniels et al. (2005), 2 Franzese (2002), 3 Calculated from the 
International Financial Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Sacrifice Ratio Estimates, Cross-Section of 16 Countriesa 
(Absolute Values of t-Ratios Based on Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 
-0.389 
0.54 
-2.900** 
2.38 
-0.424 
0.61 
-1.234 
1.61 
0.412 
0.49 
-0.406 
0.56 
0.430 
0.50 
-0.111 
0.12 
CBI 
1.284** 
1.93 
6.559*** 
2.97 
1.287** 
1.91 
3.750** 
2.61 
1.696** 
2.54 
1.291* 
1.90 
1.701** 
2.52 
1.370** 
1.97 
Trade 
0.076 
0.27 
3.025*** 
2.73 
   -0.086 
0.17 
-0.089* 
0.18 
-0.275 
0.45 
Capital 
  1.035 
0.57 
16.632** 
2.06 
-10.662 
1.44 
1.553 
0.47 
-10.131 
1.28 
-2.820 
0.31 
Inflation 
0.072* 
1.66 
0.057 
1.40 
0.076* 
1.73 
0.066 
1.43 
0.066 
1.41 
0.076* 
1.74 
0.067 
1.41 
0.076* 
1.69 
InflationΔ 
-0.123*** 
2.21 
-0.095** 
1.72 
-0.128*** 
2.39 
-0.103 
1.43 
-0.106 
1.65 
-0.131** 
2.21 
-0.109 
1.58 
-0.125** 
2.08 
Length 
0.290*** 
2.92 
0.249** 
2.52 
0.293*** 
3.02 
0.226** 
2.14 
0.231** 
2.22 
0.295*** 
2.95 
0.233** 
2.18 
0.274** 
2.61 
Wdur 
-0.292* 
1.74 
-0.235 
1.46 
-0.289 
1.66 
-0.420** 
2.42 
-0.815** 
2.47 
-0.280 
1.63 
-0.806** 
2.43 
-0.288* 
1.67 
Trade*CBI 
 -6.089** 
2.52 
      
Capital*Wdur 
    6.731* 
1.74 
 6.733* 
1.73 
 
Capital*CBI 
   -32.958* 
1.83 
    
Trade*Capital 
       2.636 
0.56 
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.382 0.288 0.348 0.345 0.289 0.345 0.294 
F Statistic 4.83 6.11 4.89 5.03 4.91 4.14 4.23 3.56 
Observations 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
a  All models omit Germany, 1973-1978, as a single outlier.   * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
1
 There can be crucial differences between the ultimate policy implications of sticky-price 
versus sticky-wage models, however, because in the former models a portion of firms 
in the economy hold prices fixed, typically in light of menu costs, even after monetary 
policymakers have engaged in policy actions, whereas in the latter models monetary 
policy actions take place before prices are set, and firms optimally choose not to adjust 
prices fully in light of wage rigidities. 
2
 The derivation of this condition mirrors Benavie (1983).  From (3) the net trade balance 
is  (p* + s - p) -  y +  y*.  If the flow demand for domestic bonds is given by bd =  y* 
+  r –  (r* + e+s 1  - s) + p
* + s, and if the flow demand for foreign bonds is given by bf 
=  y -  r +  (r* + e+s 1  - s) + p, then the net domestic capital inflow is defined as b
d – 
bf =(p* + s - p) -  y +  r -  (r* + e+s 1  - s) +  y
*, where      and     .  
Adding the expression for the trade balance to the net capital inflow yields (5). 
3
 Aizenman and Noy estimate an 87 percent linear feedback between trade openness 
and financial openness.  The simple bilateral correlation between trade openness and 
capital mobility in our data is 79 percent. 
4  One way to deal with the colinearity in our model is to test the joint significance of the 
related variables. We do so in a model that includes trade and capital as well as their 
interaction with CBI. In this model, trade and capital are jointly significant with a p-
value of 3 percent. We also combine models (4) and (5) in Table 2 and test the joint 
significance of capital, capital*Wdur, and capital*CBI. The p-value of the test of joint 
significance (two-tailed test) is 17 percent. 
